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HANNAH ARENDT AS A THEORIST OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
David Luban*
Forthcoming, symposium on “Women and International Criminal Law,” International 
Criminal Law Review 
 
 
 
 Hannah Arendt had no legal training, and before 1960 her writings display little 
interest in law or legal institutions.1 Then Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf Eichmann in 
Argentina and brought him to Jerusalem to stand trial for the crimes of the Holocaust. In 
June 1960, Arendt wrote to Mary McCarthy, “I am half toying with the idea to get some 
magazine to send me to cover the Eichmann trial. Am very tempted.”2 Arendt 
approached William Shawn, editor of The New Yorker. A bit diffidently, Shawn accepted 
her offer.3 Her friend and mentor, the philosopher Karl Jaspers, was skeptical: “The 
political realm is of an importance that cannot be captured in legal terms (the attempt to 
do so is Anglo-Saxon and a self-deception …).”4
 
 To which Arendt replied: 
I … admit that as far as the role of the law is concerned, I have been infected by the 
Anglo-Saxon influence. But quite apart from that, it seems to me to be in the nature of 
this case that we have no tools to hand except legal ones with which we have to judge and                                                         
* University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. I am 
grateful to Diane Marie Amann, Gabriella Blum, Neha Jain, Anthony Lang, Peter Margulies, Allegra 
Macleod, and Beth Van Schaack for comments on an earlier draft. 
1 For example, the half-dozen passages indexed under the word “law” in her philosophical masterpiece, The 
Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1958), are casual and undeveloped. All are brief 
statements of the idea that the law sets the boundaries within which a community’s political life can unfold, 
but none examines whatever implications follow for the nature of laws or legal institutions. 
2 Hannah Arendt to Mary McCarthy, June 20, 1960, in Carol Brightman (ed.), Between Friends: The 
Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy 1949-1975 (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1995) p. 
81. 
3 Arendt to McCarthy, Oct. 8, 1960, Brightman, supra note 2, pp. 98-99; cf. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, 
Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (Yale University Press, New Haven,1982) p. 328. 
4 Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, in Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner (eds.), Robert & Rita 
Kimber (trans.), Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926-1969 (Mariner Books, New York, 
1992) p. 413. 
 2 
pass sentence on something that cannot even be adequately represented either in legal 
terms or in political terms. That is precisely what makes the process itself, namely, the 
trial, so exciting. The question is: Would things be different if we had a law against 
hostes humani generis and not only against murderers and similar criminals?5
 
 
Arendt republished the resulting five-part New Yorker article in the 1963 book Eichmann 
in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. It became her most famous work, and by 
2006 EJ (as I shall refer to it for short) had sold almost 300,000 copies.6
EJ contains a densely argued epilogue and postscript that discuss important legal 
questions about jurisdiction and mens rea. Her thoughts about jurisdiction were partly 
worked out even before the trial began, in a fascinating exchange of letters between her 
and Jaspers, debating the merits of what today we would call truth commissions, the 
International Criminal Court, and universal jurisdiction. EJ fiercely defends the 
proposition that trials of international crimes must concern themselves solely with justice, 
with no ulterior political agenda. The mens rea discussion grows from her most famous 
concept in EJ, the “the banality of evil.” EJ also analyzes the special character of the 
crime of genocide. Arendt’s ideas are of great pertinence to students of international 
criminal law, and this article aims to develop them as they unfold from more fundamental 
themes in Arendt’s thought.  
  
                                                        
5 Arendt to Jaspers, Dec. 23, 1960, in Kohler & Sahner, supra note 4, p. 417. 
6 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised ed., (Penguin Classics, 
New York, 1964). On the number of copies sold, Amos Elon, The Excommunication of Hannah Arendt, 
<http://us.penguingroup.com/static/html/classics/essays/eichmann.html> (visited July 21, 2010). Arendt 
revised EJ in 1964, adding a new postscript responding to her critics, and it is to this edition that I refer 
throughout this article.  
EJ aroused a ferocious controversy, but that is mostly not my subject in this article. For discussion 
of the “Eichmann controversy,” see Young-Bruehl, supra note 2, at 347-66; David Laskin, Partisans: 
Marriage, Politics, and Betrayal Among the New York Intellectuals (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2000) 
pp. 238-44, 248-49. 
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Arendt’s generic label for the subject matter of international criminal law is 
“crimes against humanity,” because (like Jaspers) she believed that crimes become 
international only when they offend all of humanity.7 Her usage, obviously, bears little 
relation to standard legal terminology, in which “crime against humanity” is not the 
generic name for international crimes, but rather the specific name of one category of 
international crimes, alongside the other core crimes of aggression, war crimes, and 
genocide.8 “Core crimes” is the closest we get to a generic label for all of them. Making 
matters more confusing, in EJ Arendt treats the term “crime against humanity” as a near-
synonym for “genocide,” and she completely ignores the legal definitions in the 
Convention on Genocide and the Nuremberg Charter.9
Arendt’s unconventional use of conventional terminology may annoy legal 
readers and convince them that EJ is legally naive. That would be unfortunate. In my 
view, no theorist has thought more perceptively than Arendt about the basis of 
 She considered genocide to be the 
paradigm crime against humanity, not as defined in law but in the literal sense conveyed 
by the words themselves: a crime that offends all humanity. 
                                                        
7 Jaspers: “This case concerns all of humanity.” Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, in Kohler & Sahner, 
supra note 4, p. 413. Arendt: “The concept of hostis humani generis—however one translates it, but not: 
crime against humanness; but rather, against humanity—is more or less indispensable to the trial….I think 
we are in basic agreement on these points….” Arendt to Jaspers, Feb. 5, 1961, in Kohler & Sahner, supra 
note 4, p. 423. 
8 Diane Marie Amann has pointed out to me that the French criminal code classifies genocide side by side 
with “autres crimes contre l’humanité” within a title labeled “Des crimes contre l’humanité.” France, Code 
Pénal, Livre II, titre Ier, sous-titre Ier, 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=2010092> 
(visited Oct. 15, 2010). Arendt’s usage may well seem less unconventional to francophone jurists. 
9 She likewise ignores war crimes and the crime of aggression, perhaps because they played almost no role 
in the Eichmann case. Eichmann was not charged with aggression and only one of the fifteen counts of the 
indictment against him was for a war crime, namely “the persecution, expulsion and murder of the Jewish 
population of the countries occupied by the Germans and the other countries of the Axis, … in the course 
of fulfilling his functions as specified in the First Count.” Prosecutor v. Eichmann Indictment, Eighth 
Count, <http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-02.html> 
(visited July 23, 2010). In other words, Eichmann’s war crimes were factually indistinguishable from 
genocide. 
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international criminal liability in mass atrocities, when thousands of perpetrators commit 
acts that we label “manifestly unlawful,” without considering how thoroughly our label 
begs the question of why it wasn’t manifest to the perpetrators.  
 
I. “The Challenge of the Unprecedented” 
 Why did Arendt think that Eichmann’s crimes “cannot even be adequately 
represented either in legal terms or in political terms,” as she put it to Jaspers in the letter 
quoted above? For Arendt, the fundamental fact about the modern crime of genocide is 
the same as the fundamental fact about European totalitarianism: both confound the usual 
categories we use to make sense of moral, legal, and political life. In The Origins of 
Totalitarianism she castigates political science for “denying the outrageous, deducing the 
unprecedented from precedents, … explaining phenomena by such analogies and 
generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt.”10 
Arendt leveled a similar complaint against the legalisms of the Israeli court, which in her 
view “never rose to the challenge of the unprecedented …, [but rather] buried the 
proceedings under a flood of precedents ….”11
To take one central example, we find Arendt asserting that legal discussions of the 
act of state defense “gave the illusion that the altogether unprecedented could be judged 
according to precedents ….”
 
12
                                                        
10 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed., (Meridian, New York,1958) p. viii. I discuss 
Arendt’s ideas about explanation in politics in David Luban, ‘Hannah Arendt and the Primacy of 
Narrative’, in Legal Modernism (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,1994) p. 179, a revision of 
Luban, ‘Explaining Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Theory’, 50 Social Research (1983) 215-48. 
 The traditional act of state defense rests on a conception of 
raison d’état grounded in political necessity. “In a normal political and legal system, such 
11 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 263. 
12 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 134. 
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crimes occur as an exception to the rule …. However … in a state founded upon criminal 
principles, the situation is reversed.”13 Law becomes crime and crime becomes law.14 
Under such circumstances, non-criminal acts, like Himmler’s 1944 order to halt the 
genocide, “become a concession to necessity,”15 while crime becomes a matter of duty 
that loses “the quality by which most people recognize it—the quality of temptation.”16 
In other words, a criminal state turns the moral and legal universe upside-down, which is 
why an Eichmann, “who is in actual fact hostis generis humani, commits his crimes 
under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he 
is doing wrong.”17 To Arendt these circumstances signaled “the totality of the moral 
collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European society—not only in Germany, but in 
almost all countries ….”18 Legal precedents from normal polities offer illusory guidance 
when a criminal regime turns the background morality of society upside down. That is 
why the Jerusalem judges, “too good, and perhaps also too conscious of the very 
foundations of their profession … missed the greatest moral and even legal challenge of 
the whole case,” namely that “under the conditions of the Third Reich only ‘exceptions’ 
could be expected to act ‘normally.’”19
In reconstructing this argument I have quoted Arendt’s own language liberally, in 
part to exhibit stylistic features that enraged EJ’s critics, namely her superior tone and her 
love affair with paradoxes. Her paradoxes, in the eyes of her critics, led her to minimize 
Eichmann’s individual culpability, defying respectable common sense. (As I shall show 
 
                                                        
13 Ibid., p. 291. 
14 Ibid., p. 292; see also p. 148. 
15 Ibid., p. 291. 
16 Ibid., p. 150. 
17 Ibid., p. 276. 
18 Ibid., p. 125-26. 
19 Ibid., p. 26-27. 
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later, this completely misunderstands Arendt’s position, which is not to minimize his 
culpability but to rest it on something other than subjective mens rea.) Attributing 
Eichmann’s baffling lack of conscience to the moral collapse of his society spoils the 
morality play of the criminal trial, in which a tribunal representing decent people isolates, 
condemns, and purges the cancer cells, the deviants. In Arendt’s retelling, it turns out that 
decent people might not be so decent because criminals might not be so deviant. 
Organizers of tribunals stage their morality plays in order to spare us the need for 
acknowledging how normal some great criminals really were.  
Arendt strongly believed that international criminal trials must never be staged as 
morality plays, or for any other ulterior political reasons. “I held and hold the opinion that 
this trial had to take place in the interests of justice and nothing else.”20 That required, for 
example, excluding general evidence about the Holocaust or the sufferings of the Jews 
unless it directly implicated Eichmann, and rejecting efforts to structure the trial to teach 
political “lessons” either to the Israeli public or the world at large. One of Arendt’s major 
conclusions in EJ is that although focusing the trial on the Holocaust rather than on 
Eichmann was indeed Ben Gurion’s goal and that of the prosecutor (who Arendt 
describes in scornful terms), the judges mostly succeeded in preventing this from 
happening.21
                                                        
20 Ibid., p. 286. 
 Her justice-centered view contrasts with that of writers who emphasize the 
political, didactic aims of international criminal trials within the larger project of post-
21 Ibid., p. 3-10. On the limited role of a court of law and its inadequacy to address large historical 
questions, see the court’s well-taken reflections in Prosecutor v. Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61, 
Judgment (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), paras.1-2. Arendt’s venom against prosecutor Gideon Hausner is 
unmistakable; unfortunately, at least some of it seems to come from her German Jewish stereotypes of 
Ostjuden and “oriental” Jews. See Arendt to Heinrich Blücher, April 15, 1961, in Lotte Kohler (ed.), Peter 
Constantine (trans.), Within Four Walls: The Correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich 
Blücher 1936-1968 (Houghton Mifflin Harcout, Boston, 2000) p. 354. 
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conflict peacemaking. In her view, the exclusive focus on the guilt or innocence of 
defendants, rather than on teaching the public about the horrors of the Holocaust, is 
essential so that “all the cogs in the machinery, no matter how insignificant, are in court 
forthwith transformed back into perpetrators, that is to say, into human beings.”22
 
 This is 
how she avoids the danger of minimizing Eichmann’s culpability. 
II. The World Turned Upside Down 
 Europe’s moral collapse forms the subject of Arendt’s first major book, the 
monumental The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). She describes three linked 
phenomena of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. First was the rise of 
imperialism, especially in Africa, where European states for the first time committed 
bureaucratized mass murder grounded in racist ideology. Second was the dissolution of 
the old European class system, which left in its wake masses of “superfluous” individuals 
who could readily be mobilized into the totalitarian movements. (In EJ Arendt 
memorably describes the young Eichmann, discontentedly drifting from job to mediocre 
job, as a “leaf in the whirlwind of time, … blown … into the marching columns of the 
Thousand-Year Reich.”23
                                                        
22 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 289. 
) Third was the decline of the system of European nation-states, 
as nationalism, confronted after World War I by refugees and ethnic minorities, warped 
into a lethal compound of pseudo-science and ethnic fantasy. (Arendt notes that Soviet 
Marxism was layered on top of pan-Slavism, so that its supposed internationalism 
actually took the form of an ethnic imperialism not much different from that of Hitler.) 
Under the pressures of inflation, unemployment, and civil wars, political structures that 
23 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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had allowed ethnic groups to lead a common life within territorial states collapsed. As 
these structures disintegrated, respect for human rights disintegrated with them, and 
entire groups were officially dehumanized and removed from the protection of law, the 
first step toward mass extermination. Elites allied themselves with the mob in their 
“justified disgust … with the outlook and moral standards of the bourgeoisie.”24
 With the declaration that entire races or classes are mortal enemies, the root 
conception of humanism—that all human beings belong to a shared commonwealth (an 
idea that goes back to the Stoics)—disappears. Carl Schmitt perfectly expresses this point 
of view in his cynical slogan, “whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat.”
 What 
these intellectuals failed to realize was that their supposed unmasking of bourgeois 
morality as a hypocritical cover for crime would be taken literally by totalitarian rulers, 
who declared crime to be a duty and decency to be a crime. 
25
 
 Instead of 
humanity, there is only us and them, friend and enemy, and the destruction of the enemy 
is the ultimate meaning of politics. In Arendt’s diagnosis, precisely this outlook paved the 
way to crimes against humanity in a very literal sense. As she put it in an imaginary 
sentencing speech that the Jerusalem court might have delivered to Eichmann: 
“[J]ust as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with 
the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you and your 
superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world—
                                                        
24 Arendt, supra note 10, p. 328. For her philosophical discussion of this phenomenon, see Arendt, 
‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, in Jerome Kohn (ed)., Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken, New 
York, 2003) pp. 176-78. 
25 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, George Schwab (trans.), (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago,1996) p. 54. 
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we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to 
share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.”26
 
 
Arendt’s curiously fussy phrase “no one, that is, no member of the human race” 
underlines how strongly she believed the community that was judging Eichmann to 
consist of all human beings everywhere. The “crime against humanity” is, quite simply, 
the unwillingness to share the earth with all the peoples who inhabit it.  
 It might be objected that even if Arendt’s genealogy of totalitarianism is accurate, 
it is too closely tied to Europe in the mid-twentieth century to be of use to contemporary 
international criminal law. This objection is mistaken. Arendt’s most important point 
concerns the reversal of deviance and normality, of rule and exception, that creates the 
condition for mass atrocity. Even if the historical pathway to the inversion was very 
different in 1994 Rwanda than in 1942 Germany, the inversion itself is crucial for 
understanding both genocides—and for understanding why normal legal categories might 
offer a poor lens through which to view perpetrators. The inversion is hardly unique to 
Europe between the wars. 27 Whenever a state invokes emergency powers in the face of a 
real or imagined existential threat, it stands on the brink of inverting rule and exception; 
this is the meaning of Schmitt’s famous aphorism “Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception”28
                                                        
26 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 279. 
—for, after all, in a normal state, the sovereign is he who decides on the 
rules. 
27 The inversion of normality and decency during periods in which people commit mass atrocity is a major 
theme of Mark Drumbl’s recent book Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007), a book that draws heavily on Arendt’s observation. 
28 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, George Schwab (trans.), 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006) p. 5. 
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III. Jurisdiction and “Humanity” 
 Jaspers objected to Israel trying Eichmann because “[t]his case concerns all 
humanity ….”29
 
 He proposed 
a foolishly simplistic idea: It would be wonderful to do without the trial altogether and 
make it instead a process of examination and clarification. The goal would be the best 
possible objectification of the historical facts. The end result would not be the judges’ 
sentence, but certainty about the facts, to the extent such certainty can be attained.30
 
 
In other words, Jaspers wanted a truth commission, because the world lacks “a court that, 
as a representative of humanity, is competent to judge a crime against humanity ….”31 
For that reason, he proposed turning Eichmann and the evidence over to the United 
Nations, although he was sure that “[t]he UN would cite legal objections to wriggle out of 
this situation.”32
 Arendt disagreed with the truth commission proposal, and anticipated arguments 
that would eventually be made on behalf of the ICC and universal jurisdiction:  
 
 
The only possibility seems to be to attach to the International Court at The Hague a 
criminal court for hostes generis humani that would be competent to try individuals 
regardless of nationality. As long as such a court does not exist, international law holds 
                                                        
29 Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 413. He also fretted that “Israel 
may come away from it looking bad no matter how objective the conduct of the trial.” Jaspers to Arendt, 
Dec. 12, 1960, p. 410; see also Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, p. 413 (“Judgments passed by the victors 
on the vanquished have, in the past, been regarded as political actions and distinct from legal ones.”) 
Arendt too worried that the trial might become politicized. Arendt to Jaspers, Dec. 23, 1960, p. 416.  
30 Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, ibid., p. 413. He repeats this “utopian suggestion” in his letter of Jan. 3, 
1961, p. 420, and again in his letter of Feb. 14, 1961, where he calls it a “simpleminded fantasy,” p. 424. 
31 Jaspers to Arendt, Feb. 14, 1961, ibid., p. 424. 
32 Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, ibid., p. 413. 
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that any court in the world is competent—so why not Israel? Legally, Israel couldn’t even 
claim it isn’t competent.33
 
 
She adds: “Don’t misunderstand me: I would be all in favor of an international court with 
appropriate powers.”34 In its absence, Israel could legitimately seize and try Eichmann 
because he was “an outlaw—a hostis generis humanis, the way pirates used to be.”35
 In the same letter, she cites the passive personality principle as another basis for 
Israel to try Eichmann. By the time she wrote EJ, though, she came to doubt her earlier 
jurisdictional arguments. She rejects passive personality because it “unfortunately implies 
that criminal proceedings are initiated by the government in the name of the victims.”
 
36 
This blurs an essential difference between a civil and criminal proceeding. The former 
rectifies injuries to a victim, while the latter concerns injuries to the entire community, 
inflicted on the victim—in this case “a crime against humanity, perpetrated on the body 
of the Jewish people” rather than a crime against the Jewish people.37
 This argument against passive personality is subtle and plausible. Her argument 
against universal jurisdiction is less compelling. A few weeks after her first letter about 
jurisdiction, she writes to Jaspers, “My pirate theory won’t do.”
 
38
                                                        
33 Arendt to Jaspers, Dec. 23, 1960, ibid., p. 416. 
 Pirates by definition are 
private actors, which would make piracy solely a crime against the victims. Employing 
the same reasoning she used to reject passive personality, she rejects the pirate analogy: 
34 Ibid. 
35 Id. at 414. 
36 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 260. 
37 Ibid., p. 269; see also pp. 7, 261. Eichmann was indicted under an Israeli statute concerning crimes 
against the Jewish people, but the statute gives this term a legal definition adapted from the definitions of 
genocide and the crime of genocide in the Convention on Genocide. 
38 Arendt to Jaspers, Feb. 5, 1961, in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 423. 
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“although the crime at issue was committed primarily against the Jews, it is in no way 
limited to the Jews or the Jewish question.”39
 In my view, Arendt was too fixated on the historical connection between the 
concept of hostis generis humanis and piracy.
 
40 Curiously, it is now she rather than the 
court that seems overly attached to precedent, wrongly rejecting her initial insight that 
horrific crimes can offend all humanity and therefore can justify universal criminal 
jurisdiction even though they have nothing to do with piracy. This seems like mere 
failure of imagination on her part.41 In EJ she rejects the “analogy between genocide and 
piracy” because the Genocide Convention rejected universal jurisdiction.42 This is a 
surprisingly formalist argument; in fact it was one of the defense arguments in the 
Eichmann trial. The Israeli court had a wholly adequate rejoinder, which Arendt 
overlooked: the Genocide Convention sets territoriality as the minimum requirement for 
genocide jurisdiction, but nothing prevents states from establishing other forms of 
jurisdiction in addition.43
 Having rejected passive personality and universal jurisdiction, Arendt proposed 
her own alternative, which is far more eccentric:  
 
                                                        
39 Ibid. 
40 It comes from Cicero, who asserted in De Officiis that "a pirate is not included in the number of lawful 
enemies, but is the common foe of all the world [communis hostis omnium].” Marcus Tullius Cicero, On 
Duties, Walter Miller (trans.), (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 1913), p. 385, III.xxix.107.  
41 Furthermore, she ignores the history of universal jurisdiction. Grotius had defended universal jurisdiction 
over “gross violations of the law of nature or of nations….” Other than piracy. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of 
War and Peace, A. C. Campbell (trans.), (M. Walter Dunne Publishing, Washington, 1901) p. 247, bk. II, 
ch. 20, § 40. The Jerusalem Court quotes this passage in Prosecutor v. Eichmann, District Court of 
Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgment (1961), para.14. 
42 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 262. She is referring to Article 6, which provides that either the territorial state 
where the genocide was committed or a competent international tribunal can try the crime of genocide—
which was, in fact, a weakened alternative to universal jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iran had 
proposed universal jurisdiction, but several powerful states opposed it and prevailed. William A. Schabas, 
Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) pp. 
355-58. 
43 Prosecutor v. Eichmann, supra note 41, paras. 23-25. 
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Israel could easily have claimed territorial jurisdiction if she had only explained that 
‘territory,’ as the law understands it, is a political and a legal concept, and not merely a 
geographical term. It relates not so much, and not primarily, to a piece of land as to the 
space between individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same time 
separated and protected from, each other by all kinds of relationships, based on a 
common language, religion, a common history, customs, and laws.44
 
 
True, there are examples in law of special territorial jurisdictions not tied to “a piece of 
land”—the most obvious is a ship on the high seas, which is in the territorial jurisdiction 
of its flag state.45
What Arendt had in mind was a connection entirely unique to the Jews and the 
state of Israel: she explains that “the Jewish people had … created and maintained its 
own specific in-between space throughout the long centuries of dispersion,”
 It is equally true that territorial jurisdiction is a legal rather than 
geographical concept. But declaring that territorial jurisdiction bears no essential 
connection to territory is farfetched. It is also unnecessary. 
46 and 
apparently she believes that this is why the Jewish state could assert jurisdiction once it 
came into existence. The argument itself is not fanciful: in fact, the Jerusalem court used 
exactly this argument about the connection between Israel and the Diaspora to justify 
taking jurisdiction under the protective principle.47
 To summarize: Arendt, in accord with Jaspers, believed that the grounds of 
jurisdiction suitable for international crime must be limited to those appropriate to crimes 
 The fanciful part is the claim that such 
jurisdiction is in any sense territorial. 
                                                        
44 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 262-63. 
45 For examples in U.S. law, see 18 U.S.C. § 7. 
46 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 263. 
47 Prosecutor v. Eichmann, supra note 41, paras. 34-35. Curiously, Arendt makes no mention of the 
protective principle as a possible source of jurisdiction. 
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that offend against all humanity. On principle, the correct forum would therefore be an 
international tribunal; second best would be a national court exercising universal 
jurisdiction. Eventually Arendt rejected universal jurisdiction, but for weak reasons. Her 
argument for avoiding passive personality jurisdiction is stronger: passive personality 
“localizes” the crime to an offense against its victims, and therefore misses the sense in 
which the crime offends all of humanity, and in which a domestic court serves as a proxy 
for humanity rather than its own state’s nationals. 
 
IV. Genocide and Group Identity 
 As I mentioned, EJ uses the terms “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” 
interchangeably, in disregard of significant differences in their legal definitions. One 
reason we have seen is that Arendt uses the term “crime against humanity” in a 
nontechnical way, to designate a crime that offends all of humanity. 
 She explains what she has in mind when she distinguishes the crimes of expulsion 
and genocide. 
 
Expulsion of nationals … is already an offense against humanity, if by “humanity” we 
understand no more than the comity of nations …. It was when the Nazi regime declared 
that the German people … wished to make the entire Jewish people disappear from the 
face of the earth that the new crime, the crime against humanity—in the sense of a crime 
“against the human status,” or against the very nature of mankind—appeared …. 
[Genocide] is an attack on human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the 
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“human status” without which the very words “mankind” or “humanity” would be devoid 
of meaning.48
 
 
At first glance, Arendt’s reference to “human diversity as such” makes her reasoning 
sound remarkably similar to Raphaël Lemkin’s argument for singling out genocide as a 
distinctive crime. For Lemkin, national or ethnic groups as such are essential to 
humanity, because they have value over and above the individuals who make them up. 
Lemkin emphasizes the contributions that members of different national groups have 
made to world culture: the Jews produced Einstein and Spinoza, the Poles Copernicus, 
Chopin, and Curie; the Czechs, Huss and Dvorak; the Greeks, Plato and Socrates; the 
Russians, Tolstoy and Shostakovich.49
Contrary to the initial impression of similarity, though, Arendt’s approach breaks 
sharply with Lemkin’s. Her own views about the value of groups have nothing to do with 
their cultural contributions, and indeed she finds the emphasis on geniuses belonging to 
minority groups morally repugnant.
 Because Lemkin focused on the contributions of 
groups to civilization, he insisted that the law must protect groups by criminalizing the 
intentional effort to destroy a group (national, ethnic, racial, or religious) as such. That, of 
course, is precisely what the legal definition of genocide does, and its focus on intent to 
destroy groups “as such” is the feature that distinguishes genocide from the crime against 
humanity of extermination. 
50
                                                        
48 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 268-69. 
 What she means by diversity is individual 
49 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1944) p. 91. The list is 
Lemkin’s own. 
50 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 132-34 (criticizing preferential treatment of Jewish elites). “There are more 
than a few people, especially among the cultural elite, who still publicly regret the fact that Germany sent 
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uniqueness, not group diversity. In The Human Condition, she defines the key term 
“plurality” in individualist terms: “In man, otherness, which he shares with everything 
that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, becomes uniqueness, and 
human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.”51 (Paradoxical, because 
Arendt also emphasizes human equality.) This is notably different from standard usage in 
American political science, where “pluralism” means group pluralism—a usage closer to 
Lemkin’s. Although in EJ she chooses the word “diversity” rather than “plurality,” she 
clearly means the same thing: both words designate the defining characteristic of 
humanity, which lies in the human condition of individual difference from all one’s 
peers.52
At this point it will be useful to examine Arendt’s own views about identity 
groups and identity politics. She scorned romantic nationalism, which “holds a nation to 
be an eternal organic body, the product of inevitable natural growth of inherent qualities,” 
and which “explains peoples, not in terms of political organizations, but in terms of 
biological superhuman qualities.”
 In this connection, her earlier-quoted argument that trials must focus exclusively 
on the perpetrator, because only that turns him from a cog in a machine into a human 
being, turns out to be no exaggeration. 
53
                                                                                                                                                                     
Einstein packing, without realizing that it was a much greater crime to kill little Hans Cohn from around the 
corner, even though he was no genius.” Ibid., p. 134.  
 At bottom, she wholly rejects the communitarian 
thesis that attachments to groups give us our identity and creates pre-political obligations 
of loyalty. This rejection comes out most clearly in her exchange of letters about EJ with 
51 Arendt, supra note 1, p. 176. 
52 Ibid., p. 175. 
53 Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, in Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman, (eds.), Hannah Arendt, 
The Jewish Writings (Schocken, New York, 2007) pp. 343, 366-67. In a 1933 letter to Jaspers, she 
remarked that every use of a phrase like “the German character” “is almost identical with misuse.” Arendt 
to Jaspers, Jan. 6, 1933, Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 18. 
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Gershom Scholem (the great scholar of Jewish mysticism).54 Scholem was deeply 
offended by Arendt’s tone as well as her criticisms of the wartime Jewish leadership and 
the Israelis. He chided her for lack of “Herzenstakt”—i.e., lack of heart—and told her 
that, as “wholly a daughter of our people” she should have been more circumspect.55 “In 
the Jewish tradition there is a concept … which we know as Ahabath Israel: ‘Love of the 
Jewish people….’”56
 
 She responded: 
I found it puzzling that you should write “I regard you wholly as a daughter of our 
people, and in no other way.” The truth is I have never pretended to be anything else or to 
be in any way other than I am, and I have never even felt tempted in that direction. It 
would have been like saying that I was a man and not a woman—that is to say, kind of 
insane …. To come to the point: let me begin …with what you call “love of the Jewish 
people” or Ahabath Israel ….You are quite right—I am not moved by any “love” of this 
sort … : I have never in my life “loved” any people or collective—neither the German 
people, nor the French, nor the Americans, nor the working class or anything of that sort. 
I indeed “love” only my friends and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the 
love of persons.57
 
 
Now in fact, Arendt’s Jewish identification ran deep. She wrote extensively on Jewish 
affairs—her collected Jewish writings run more than 500 pages and span five decades. In 
France before the Occupation she worked for a Zionist organization, Youth Aliyah, and 
                                                        
54 Scholem’s letter and Arendt’s are published together in Ron H. Feldman (ed.), The Jew as Pariah: 
Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (Grove Press, New York, 1978), now regrettably out of 
print. Scholem published his letter (without Arendt’s) in On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: Selected Essays 
(Schocken, New York,1976) p. 300; and Arendt’s letter (without Scholem’s) appears in Kohn and 
Feldman, supra note 53, p. 465. 
55 Scholem to Arendt, June 23, 1963, in Feldman, supra note 54, pp. 241-42. 
56 Ibid., p. 241. 
57 Arendt to Scholem, July 24, 1963, ibid., p. 246; Kohn and Feldman, supra note 53, pp. 466-67. 
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after the war she became executive director of Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, a 
nongovernmental organization that recovered a vast trove of Jewish books and cultural 
objects.58 Her commitment to the Jewish homeland was passionate, although her Zionism 
favored what would today be called a one-state solution—a Jewish homeland within a 
binational commonwealth, but not a Jewish state—a view that was more mainstream in 
the 1940s than it is today, when it is a hallmark of anti-Zionism.59
 In my view there is no contradiction between Arendt’s outright denial that love of 
a people is a coherent concept and her own identity politics. Her views about group-based 
identity are philosophically subtle. Although she rejects group-based metaphysics, she 
nevertheless believes that describing our identity in terms of ethnicity may sometimes be 
politically necessary: 
 
 
[F]or many years I considered the only adequate reply to the question, Who are you? to 
be: A Jew. That answer alone took into account the reality of persecution. As for the 
statement with which Nathan the Wise (in effect, though not in actual wording) countered 
the command: “Step closer, Jew”—the statement: I am a man—I would have considered 
as nothing but a grotesque and dangerous evasion of reality. 
... When I use the word “Jew” I do not mean to suggest any special kind of 
human being .... Rather, I was only acknowledging a political fact through which my 
being a member of this group outweighed all other questions of personal identity or rather 
had decided them in favor of anonymity, of namelessness. Nowadays such an attitude 
would seem like a pose .... Unfortunately, the basically simple principle in question here                                                         
58 Young-Bruehl, supra note 2, pp. 134, 143-44, 187-88. 
59 See her crucial essays in The Jewish Writings: ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, in Kohn and Feldman, supra 
note 53, pp. 343-74; ‘The Jewish State: Fifty Years After, Where Have Herzl’s Politics Led?’, ibid., pp. 
375-87; ‘To Save the Jewish Homeland’, ibid., pp. 388-401; and ‘Peace or Armistice in the Near East?’, 
ibid., pp. 423-50. While some of her concerns in these essays are dated (e.g., the possible Israeli turn 
toward the Soviet Union), others are eerily prophetic. 
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is one that is particularly hard to understand in times of defamation and persecution: the 
principle that one can resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack.60
 
 
What Arendt is getting at, I think, is what might be deemed a political theory of ethnic 
identity. That is, utterances such as “I am a Jew” are not simply neutral descriptions, nor 
are they metaphysical statements that group affiliation constitutes individual identity. 
Rather, they are speech acts of alliance and confrontation. 
Had Arendt, living in Paris in 1940, replied to the question, “Who are you?” by 
saying “I am a German” or “I am a human being,” she would have been hiding. The reply 
would have disowned other Jews, abandoned them to their fate, and let her questioner 
evade responsibility. By replying “I am a Jew,” on the other hand, she would show her 
solidarity, as well as compel the questioner to acknowledge the Nazi persecution and 
situate himself in relation to it. When she arrived in America in 1941, she kept her birth 
name rather than taking her German husband’s “because I wanted my name to identify 
me as a Jew.”61
Delivering a speech in Hamburg, in 1959, however, Arendt claims that to reply “I 
am a Jew” would just be a pose. And surely she is right—it would be cheap victimology, 
said only to make her German audience squirm. Differences in political situation define 
differences in the speech acts performed by ascriptions of ethnicity. Thus the utterance “I 
am a Jew” can be factually true, false as a statement about essence or identity (“when I 
use the word ‘Jew’ I do not mean to suggest any special kind of human being”), and 
politically indeterminate, performing entirely different speech acts depending on the 
 
                                                        
60 Hannah Arendt, ‘On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts About Lessing’, in Men in Dark Times (Mariner 
Books, New York, 1968), pp. 17-18. 
61 Arendt to Jaspers, Jan. 29. 1946, in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 29. 
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circumstances. Arendt claims that group identification becomes politically indispensable 
in circumstances of persecution because “one can resist only in terms of the identity that 
is under attack.” This is not an “essentialist” claim about groups constituting identity. Nor 
is it Lemkin’s claim about the value of groups “as such.” 
Arendt is no liberal individualist. She notes approvingly that the Romans, 
“perhaps the most political people we have known, used the words ‘to live’ and ‘to be 
among men’ … as synonyms.”62 But she distinguished sharply between the human being 
as a political and a social animal.63 For Arendt, the significance of group identity lies in 
the group’s participation in political action, not in its social affinities. That is why she 
defended Israel against one of the chief accusations of its pre-independence opponents, 
that Israel is an artificial construction. “A generation brought up in the blind faith in 
necessity—of history or economy or society or nature—found it difficult to understand 
that precisely this artificiality gave the Jewish achievements in Palestine their human 
significance.”64
 Her exalted view of politics explains Arendt’s strange theory of territorial 
jurisdiction. Recall her assertion that territory refers not to a “piece of land” but to “the 
space between individuals in a group” where they fashion their common life.
 All political constructions are artificial: they result from human action 
which imbues them with meaning. Their artificiality is the source of, not an objection to, 
their value. In Arendt’s famous triad of human activities—labor, work, and action—it is 
the last, political action, that displays the basic human condition of plurality. 
65
                                                        
62 Arendt, supra note 1, p. 7. 
 Arendt 
63 Ibid., pp. 22-28. 
64 ‘Peace or Armistice in the Near East?’, in Kohn and Feldman, supra note 53, p. 435. She also dismissed 
the accusation of colonialism: “The building of a Jewish national home was not a colonial enterprise in 
which Europeans came to exploit foreign riches with the help and at the expense of native labor.” Ibid., pp. 
434-35. There were no riches in Palestine, and Jewish labor competed with “native labor.” 
65 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 262. 
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frequently invokes the concept of an in-between space (or, as she sometimes calls it, a 
“space of appearance”) as the location of politics.66
 It follows that Arendt would strongly reject Lemkin’s theoretical basis for 
defining separate crimes of genocide and extermination, namely the special value he 
assigned to groups “as such.”
 For her, human beings dwell first and 
foremost among each other, and any condition that establishes a political space where we 
act together and in each other’s sight serves the function of geographical territory. Instead 
of invoking territorial jurisdiction, she should have proposed simply that shared politics 
should suffice to create legal jurisdiction for crimes that attack it. Israel’s jurisdiction 
over Eichmann arose because of Israel’s connection with the Jews and their political life, 
not because the Jews form an ethnic or religious group. 
67
 
 Groups have value only through the political life they 
create, which of course does not exclude their language, culture, religion, and customs. 
Given the value Arendt places on politics, it is safe to say that she would have likewise 
objected to the still-controversial exclusion of political groups from the list of protected 
groups in the legal definition of genocide; in an important sense, she would have argued 
that political groups are the only ones that have value “as such.” 
V. The Banality of Evil 
We come finally to the banality of evil, the signature concept of EJ. The phrase 
“banality of evil” appears only twice in Eichmann in Jerusalem—once, with no 
explication, in the text, and once in the subtitle. In 1971 Arendt explained that the phrase 
refers to                                                         
66 See, e.g., Arendt, supra note 1, pp. 198-99 (on the polis as “space of action” or “space of appearance”). 
67 I agree with her. David Luban, ‘Calling Genocide By Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the 
U.N. Report’, 7 Chicago Journal of International Law (2006) pp. 303-20.  
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no theory or doctrine but something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds, 
committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of 
wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal 
distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness. However monstrous the deeds were, 
the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic, and the only specific characteristic one 
could detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police 
examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite 
authentic inability to think.68
 
 
In EJ she uses the final phrase with a significant addition: “inability to think, namely, to 
think from the standpoint of somebody else.”69 She elaborates the idea that thinking 
requires adopting multiple points of view in her late philosophy of mind, where she 
distinguishes this ability from intelligence, and connects thinking both with personal 
identity and with the capacity for moral judgment.70
In the posthumously-published Life of the Mind, Arendt explains that our tradition 
attributes evil to any number of things: the pride of Lucifer, the resentment and self-
loathing of Richard III, the envy of Cain, the weakness of Macbeth, the depraved hatred 
of Iago or Claggart, the covetousness and cupidity that we are told is the “root of all 
evil.”
 Arendt’s ideas are philosophically 
rich, but this is not the place to discuss them. 
71
                                                        
68 Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, supra note 24, p. 159. 
 In Eichmann she found none of these, only an inability to function without the 
69 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 49. Emphasis in original. 
70 Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, supra note 24, p. 182-87. This essay is the best 
introduction to Arendt’s late moral psychology and moral philosophy—better, in my opinion, than 
Thinking, which is overloaded with intricacy. See also Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight 
Exercises in Political Thought, rev. ed., (Viking Press, New York, 1968) pp. 220-21, 241, discussing 
Kant’s conception of “enlarged mentality” as the foundation of political judgment. 
71 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Part One: Thinking, one-volume ed., (Harcourt Brace, New 
York,1978) pp. 3-4. 
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“clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and 
conduct” that “have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that 
is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of 
their existence.”72
It is unfortunate that Arendt waited to define “banality of evil,” EJ’s most 
misunderstood phrase. Arendt’s critics have variously supposed her to have meant that 
Eichmann was legally or morally innocent of his crimes (despite her insistence that 
Eichmann was “one of the greatest criminals of that period”
 This is what she means by Eichmann’s inability to think.  
73); or that all of us are 
potential Eichmanns or just as guilty as Eichmann (despite her explicit statements to the 
contrary74); or that mass murder is banal, at least to refined intellectuals such as herself 
(despite the fact that she had devoted her career to thinking about little else); or that 
Eichmann’s fault lay in stupidity (despite her elaborate efforts to distinguish thought from 
intellect and thoughtlessness from stupidity75
Arendt always denied that she was writing “a theoretical treatise on the nature of 
evil”; she insisted that it was only a trial report, and that “when I speak of the banality of 
evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level ….”
). 
76
                                                        
72 Ibid., p. 4. She makes the same point on p. 177, and in Arendt, supra note 6, p. 287. 
 Perhaps this is why she neglected to 
define the term. In private correspondence with McCarthy, she reiterated that she had no 
73 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 288. 
74 Ibid., p. 296. 
75 Ibid., pp. 287-88; Arendt, supra note 71, pp. 13, 57. For examples of these misfired criticisms by two 
eminent historians, see Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, 
and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001) pp. 55-56; Tony Judt, ‘At Home in 
This Century’, New York Review of Books, April 6, 1995, p. 10. 
76 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 285, 287. See also Arendt, supra note 71, p. 3. The term “trial report” is in 
Arendt, supra note 6, p. 280. 
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“ideas” in EJ, only “a faithful description of a phenomenon.”77 In her 1964 postscript to 
EJ, she describes her book as “simple reporting.”78
 These claims are disingenuous. The fact is that well before she first saw 
Eichmann at the trial, she wrote Jaspers about Eichmann’s “bizarre vacuousness.”
 
79
 
 More 
importantly, the idea that some perpetrators of great evil are conventional people without 
monstrous motives was not new to Arendt. As early as 1945, she described 
the characteristic personality of the man who can boast that he was the organizing spirit 
of the murder. Heinrich Himmler is not one of those intellectuals stemming from the dim 
No Man’s Land between the Bohemian and the Pimp, whose significance in the 
composition of the Nazi élite has been repeatedly stressed of late. He is neither a 
Bohemian like Goebbels, nor a sex criminal like Streicher, nor a perverted fanatic like 
Hitler, nor an adventurer like Goering. He is a “bourgeois” with all the outer aspect of 
respectability, all the habits of a good paterfamilias who does not betray his wife and 
anxiously seeks to secure a decent future for his children ....80
 
 
Furthermore, the phrase may have originated with Jaspers, not Arendt. In 1946 Jaspers 
wrote her that rather than attributing demonic power to Nazism, “we have to see these 
things in their total banality, in their prosaic triviality, because that’s what truly 
characterizes them. Bacteria can cause epidemics that wipe out nations, but they remain 
                                                        
77 Arendt to McCarthy, Sept. 20, 1963, Brightman, supra note 2, p. 148; Arendt to McCarthy, Oct. 3, 1963, 
in ibid., p. 152. 
78 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 287. 
79 “I would never be able to forgive myself if I didn’t go and look at this walking disaster face to face in all 
his bizarre vacuousness.” Arendt to Jaspers, Dec. 2, 1960, in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, pp. 409-10. 
Only a few days into the trial, she fulminated to her husband that a statement of Eichmann’s was “so 
damned banal….” Arendt to Heinrich Blücher, April 20, 1961, in Kohler, supra note 21, p. 357. 
80 Hannah Arendt, ‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility’, in Jerome Kohn (ed.), Essays in 
Understanding 1930-1954 (Houghton Mifflin Harcout, New York, 1993) p. 128. 
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merely bacteria.”81 It seems entirely plausible that Jaspers’s phrase stuck in Arendt’s 
memory. She used similar imagery in her letter to Scholem: evil “possesses neither depth 
nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely 
because it spreads like a fungus on the surface.”82 Far from being an untheoretical 
observation, the idea that evil lacks depth has a long philosophical pedigree. It echoes St. 
Augustine, about whom Arendt wrote her Ph.D. thesis: Augustine wrote that seeking a 
cause for evil “is like trying to see darkness or to hear silence,” because evil “is not a 
matter of efficiency, but of deficiency; the evil will itself is not effective but defective.”83 
The banality of evil likewise has obvious echoes of her teacher Heidegger’s discussion of 
“everydayness” in Being and Time.84
 That does not make the banality of evil a mere philosophical speculation, 
however. Decades of research in experimental social psychology confirm that ordinary, 
non-monstrous people will do monstrous things—apparently without perceiving the 
monstrosity—in situations where role, authority, or peer pressure demand it.
 
85
                                                        
81 Jaspers to Arendt, Oct. 19, 1946, in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 62. 
 If 
anything, Arendt’s insights into the banality of evil should by now be regarded as solidly 
82 Arendt to Scholem, in Kohn and Feldman, supra note 53, p. 471. Arendt’s image is more accurate than 
Jaspers’s: she notices that a fungus on the surface can lay the world to waste without penetrating to the 
depth of Jaspers’s “bacteria that wipe out nations.” 
83 St. Augustine, City of God (Henry Bettenson (trans.), (Penguin, London, 1984) p. 480, 12.7; ibid., p. 473, 
12.2.  
84 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.), (Harper, New York, 
1962) pp. 149-69, sections 25-27. 
85 These include the famous Milgram and Stanford Prison experiments, but also many others in the 
“situationist” tradition of experimental psychology. See, e.g., Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person 
and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia,1991); Philip 
Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (Random House, New York, 
2007). 
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empirical, not philosophical (although whether Eichmann himself fit the diagnosis or 
simply fooled Arendt is a different question).86
 The “banal” perpetrator is, at bottom, a moral chameleon whose values conform 
themselves to their environment. Lacking “an unequivocal voice of conscience,”
 
87 he 
equates right with normal and wrong with exceptional.88 In a decent polity, this confusion 
generally stands him in good stead. Disaster results when a criminal regime turns 
morality upside down and inverts ordinary legal rules and exceptions. Those are the 
circumstances in which everyday banality transmutes into the banality of evil. In 
Arendt’s account, the banality of evil and state criminality fit together as cognate 
concepts.89
 The question is what legal significance the banality of evil has. One possible 
answer is that it has no significance: banality of evil refers to the perpetrator’s motives, 
and motives are irrelevant in criminal law. Mens rea deals with intent and knowledge, not 
motive, and nobody suggested that Eichmann acted unintentionally or lacked knowledge 
of what he was doing or the consequences to his victims. Arendt asserts that “in all 
modern legal systems … intent to do wrong is necessary for the commission of a 
crime.”
  
90
                                                        
86 Eichmann’s interrogator, Israeli captain Avner Less, thought Eichmann was a desperate liar. Johen von 
Lang (ed.), Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police, Ralph Manheim 
(trans.), (Da Capo Press, Cambridge MA,1983), at vi-vii. See also Abigail L. Rosenthal, A Good Look at 
Evil (Temple University Press, Philadelphia,1987) p. 167. 
 But, a lawyer might object, this assertion misstates the requirements of mens 
rea, which include knowledge that an act is wrongful (in the sense of unlawful) only for a 
87 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 148. 
88 Ibid., pp. 148, 293. 
89 Taking off from her analysis, I argue that international criminal law ought to broaden its scope to include 
criminal states and regimes as well as criminal individuals. David Luban, ‘State Criminality and the 
Ambition of International Criminal Law’, in Tracy Isaacs and Richard Vernon (eds.), Accountability for 
Collective Wrongdoing, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, forthcoming). 
90 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 277. 
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subset of crimes—generally either purely regulatory (mala prohibita) offenses, or those 
specific intent (dolus specialis) crimes whose statutes specify knowledge of the act’s 
illegality as an element. As for intent to do moral wrong or knowledge that one’s act is 
morally wrong, neither are legal requirements for criminal conviction, and neither 
belongs to the legal concept of mens rea. 
 On the other hand, consider the defense of superior orders and mistake of law in 
the Rome Statute. It relieves a defendant of liability if: (1) the defendant was ordered to 
commit the crime and lay under a “legal obligation to obey” the order; (2) the defendant 
“did not know that the order was unlawful”; and (4) “[t]he order was not manifestly 
unlawful.” 91 Eichmann had his orders, and to his knowledge they were legally obligatory 
under the Nazi doctrine Führerworte haben Gesetzeskraft—for no one doubted that 
Hitler ordered the Final Solution.92 Were the orders “manifestly unlawful”? The answer 
is obviously yes—in a normal environment. But in an upside-down system, where every 
responsible person in Eichmann’s chain of command enthusiastically supported mass 
murder, and where the resources of the state were conspicuously devoted to it, in what 
sense is the unlawfulness of mass murder “manifest”? Article 33 completely evades this 
uncomfortable question by stipulating that “orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful.”93
                                                        
91 UN Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries o the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
(U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9th)[the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court], art. 33 (titled “Superior 
orders and prescription of law”). Article 32 of the same statute provides that mistake of law can be a 
defense under the conditions of Article 33. 
 A stipulation is no answer. Arendt is clearly correct 
that the “plausibility” of such an answer “rests on the assumption that the law expresses 
92 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 24, 128. 
93 Rome Statute, supra note 91, art. 33(2). 
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only what every man’s conscience would tell him anyhow”94
 This is the biggest challenge that Arendt poses to international criminal law. 
When faced with a criminal state, and “banal” perpetrators who recognize evil only when 
it deviates from prevailing norms, the basis for criminal punishment must somehow be 
severed from subjective mens rea.  
—in other words, that intent 
to commit these acts is intent to do wrong.  
 This perhaps explains Arendt’s preoccupation with the hostis generis humanii. 
Eichmann may have lacked subjective awareness of guilt, but that made him no less the 
enemy of humanity. “Because he had been implicated and played a central role in an 
enterprise whose open purpose was to eliminate forever certain ‘races’ from the surface 
of the earth, he had to be eliminated.”95 Unfortunately, the label hostis generis humanii 
creates as many problems as it solves—not least Schmitt’s concern that it makes the 
perpetrator “a monster who must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.”96 
Arendt never came up with a satisfactory conception of objective culpability, nor did she 
claim to. In the Eichmann case, she believed that the Jerusalem judges “really passed 
judgment solely on the basis of the monstrous deeds” rather than the legal standards and 
precedents they cited in their opinion.97 In her eyes, this was a good thing.98
                                                        
94 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 293; see also p. 148. 
 But that is a 
95 Ibid., p. 277. 
96 Schmitt, supra note 25, p. 36. Cicero wrote in De Officiis that “we have no ties of fellowship with a 
tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud ... [T]hose fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off 
from what may be called the common body of humanity.” Cicero, supra note 40, p. 299, III.vi.32. 
97 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 294. 98 Arendt’s major preoccupation in the last decade of her life was an analysis of judgment and the central 
place it occupies among our mental and moral faculties. At Arendt’s death, the title page with epigraphs of 
her unwritten book on judgment, the capstone of her trilogy on the life of the mind, was in her typewriter. 
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troubling thought for jurists, who mistrust “kadi justice” that passes judgment freely on 
the facts.99
 Notwithstanding her complaint that the court buried the unprecedented under a 
flood of precedents, Arendt knew it too, and she understood that no court can simply 
bypass eight hundred years of criminal jurisprudence linking culpability with mens rea. 
In the sole passage in EJ where she explains the basis of Eichmann’s culpability in the 
absence of subjective awareness of wrongdoing, she writes: 
 Jurists know that legal tools are the only ones they possess.  
 
We refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propositions “that a great crime offends nature, 
so that the very earth cries out for vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which 
only retribution can restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to 
punish the criminal” (Yosal Rogat). And yet I think it is undeniable that it was precisely 
on the ground of these long-forgotten propositions that Eichmann was brought to justice 
to begin with, and that they were, in fact, the supreme justification for the death 
penalty.100
 
 
There is a striking ambivalence in this passage. As we saw, Arendt’s critique of 
culpability resting on subjective mens rea drives her (and us) toward these “long-
forgotten propositions,” and the final words in the passage make it sound as though she 
accepts them as “supreme justification” for the verdict. On the other hand, we “refuse, 
and consider as barbaric” those very propositions.101
                                                        
99 “We do not sit like a kadi under a tree, dispensing justice according to considerations of individual 
expediency.” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (19)(Frankfurter, J. dissenting).  
 When she summarizes her 
100 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 254. 
101 Of course “the very earth cries out for vengeance” comes from God’s words to Cain in Genesis 4:10, 
“your brother’s blood cries out from the earth.” 
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complaints about the Eichmann trial, they are at bottom legal complaints, not complaints 
about legality: 
 
In sum, the failure of the Jerusalem court consisted in its not coming to grips with three 
fundamental issues, all of which have been sufficiently well known and widely discussed 
since the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: the problem of impaired justice in the 
court of the victors; a valid definition of the “crime against humanity”; and a clear 
recognition of the new criminal who commits this crime.102
 
 
Comparing Arendt’s initial enthusiasm for the Eichmann trial in her first letter to Jaspers 
with the far more subdued postscript to EJ, it seems clear that she had become chastened 
watching the trial unfold. Perhaps she could not decide whether the problem was a 
remediable defect in the Jerusalem proceedings or a fundamental mismatch between the 
law and the crime. All the questions she asked remain with us today, and they remain the 
biggest questions international criminal law must answer.103
 
 
 
                                                        
102 Ibid., p. 251. 
103 I am grateful to Allegra Macleod for the reading of Arendt expressed in the final paragraphs. 
